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ABSTRACT
This article looks at the impact of anthropogenic climate change and
its associated costs in the Canadian context. It begins by outlining how
climate change is predicted to alter the Canadian climate before
evaluating how this will affect the insurance industry. It determines
that insurers’ response to the unpredictable risks and high costs
associated with climate change will lead to significant gaps in coverage.
How litigation of major carbon polluters could help cover some of the
costs associated with climate change by holding polluters accountable
is considered. State-led climate litigation can overcome some of the
litigation obstacles identified and it may be preferable to civil litigation.
The current state of civil and state-led litigation will be inadequate to
address the mounting costs associated with climate change. Thus, the
article considers the use of legislation to assist state-led litigation
against major carbon polluters, which would be modeled after the
tobacco legislation first used in British Columbia. The article
contemplates how these funds could be disbursed into disaster relief
and no-fault insurance schemes to compensate for climate loss and
damage, as well as briefly discussing the international concerns relevant
to these domestic issues. Ultimately, it is determined that there are
viable combinations of legislation, litigation, taxation, compensation,
mitigation, adaptation, and insurance that can better prepare Canada
for managing the high costs associated with anthropogenic climate
change.
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INTRODUCTION: CLIMATE CHANGE IN CANADA
The world is getting warmer. There have been unprecedented changes to
earth’s climate since the 1950s and each of the last three decades has been
successively warmer than any preceding decade since 1850. 1 Undoubtedly, there
is a problem and it is clear human influence is contributing to observed climate
change. Since the pre-industrial era, there has been a dramatic increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions that has led to “atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are
unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.”2 In a 2014 report, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) used Representative
Concentration Pathways (“RCP”) to outline the different trajectories that
increases in surface temperature may take. RCP 2.6 represents a scenario where
temperatures do not increase more than 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures,
which would be in line with the upper limits from the Paris Agreement.3 Globally,
the faster emissions are cut, the easier it will be to meet RCP 2.6.4

Figure 1: Details the expected RCPs in relation to annual emissions. Source: IPCC, 2014:
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change, at 9.

IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change [Core Writing team, RK
Pachauri and LA Meyer eds] IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, at 2.
2 Ibid at 4.
3 Ibid at 9. Warming of less than 2° C would likely be exceeded under RCP 8.5, RCP 6.0, and RCP 4.5, but
warming of 2° C is unlikely to be exceeded if global emissions follow RCP 2.6.
4 Ibid.
1
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In 2016, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) reached the COP-21 Paris Agreement, which has 195 signatories,
186 of which have ratified.5 The agreement seeks to limit the increase in global
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and ideally to
keep it as low as 1.5° C.6 However, based on current commitments, it is unlikely
that the COP-21 temperature targets will be feasible.7 Rather, it is suggested that
surface temperatures could increase by as much as 3.1-5.2°C by 2100.8 Regardless,
global surface temperatures are expected to rise under even the most optimistic
emission scenarios. Canada is already experiencing significant warming. Canada
registered its warmest year on record in 2010, which was 3°C above normal, and
Canada’s average annual surface temperature has warmed by 1.5°C from 19502010.9 The rate of warming differs across the country, but the average rate of
warming over this period is about twice the global average. 10
The implication of exceeding RCP 2.6 is that the attendant effects of climate
change will occur with more frequency and with greater intensity. 11 The Canadian
climate will not be immune from the deleterious effects of climate change. In
Canada, rising temperatures will mean that severe precipitation events, droughts,
heatwaves, floods, and other extreme weather events will become more
prevalent.12 Rising sea levels, changes in seasonal arctic ice flow, and changes in
ground temperature will also pose significant problems.13 As the frequency and
severity of these events intensify the costs associated with them will increase
United Nations, “United Nations Treaty Collections” (November 4, 2016), available online at: <
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-7-d.en.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7d&chapter=27&clang=_en>.
6 Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015, UNFCCC, 21st Sess, (2015) art 2(a).
7 Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, “Here’s How Far the World is from Meeting Its Climate Goals” (6
November 17) The New York Times, online:
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/06/climate/world-emissions-goals-far-off-course.html>;
Lucas Bergkamp, “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: A Risk Regulation Perspective” (2016) 7:1
EJRR 35 at 36; Rogelj et al, “Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well
Below 2°C” (2016) 534 Nature IJS 631 at 631.
8 Bergkamp, supra note 7 at 36.
9 Natural Resources Canada, Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on Impacts and Adaptation, by
Warren FJ & Lemmen DS eds, (Canada: Minister of Natural Resources, 2014), at 27.
10 Insurance Bureau of Canada, The Economic Impacts of the Weather Effects of Climate Change on
Communities, (Guelph, 2015) at 32.
11 IPCC, supra note 1 at 10.
12 Warren & Lemmen, supra note 9 at 11.
13 IBC, supra note 10 at 32.
5
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significantly. Canada’s residential, commercial, industrial, and municipal
infrastructure will be especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change. For
example, a 2012 report by the Insurance Bureau of Canada (“IBC”) found that
30% of Canada’s municipal infrastructure was either “fair” or “very poor” and
that the associated replacement costs were $171.8 billion nationally.14 Loss and
damage from climate change will expose both insurers and the Canadian
government to significant risk, and by extension, all Canadians.

INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN CANADA
Canadian insurers and disaster relief funds are already paying out far more
for climate related harms than they ever have before. In the last 6 fiscal years the
federal government has spent more on recovering from large-scale natural
disasters than in the previous 39 fiscal years combined.15 The federal Disaster
Financial Assistance Arrangements program paid out $2.4 billion from 1970-2008
and $3.3 billion from 2009-2015.16 The private insurance industry displays a
similar pattern. From 1983 to 2004, insured losses averaged $373 million a year
and they increased to an average of $1.2 billion a year between 2005-2015.17 In a
2011 report, The National Roundtable on the Economy and the Environment
projected climate costs, under a low climate change-slow growth scenario, to
grow from $5 billion a year in 2020 to somewhere between $21 billion to $43
billion a year by 2050.18 Alternatively, under a high climate change-rapid growth
scenario, climate costs could increase to somewhere between $43 billion to $91
billion annually by 2050.19 These discrepancies highlight the uncertainty in
modelling climate change related weather events, as well as the significant risks
and costs associated with climate change.20 The further we deviate from RCP 2.6

Ibid at 34.
Canada, Office of the Auditor General, Report 2 – Mitigating the Impacts of Severe Weather, (Report to
Parliament), Spring 2016 Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
(Canada: 2016) at 1.
16 Ibid.
17 Canada, Clean Energy Canada, The Costs of Climate Change, by Clare Demerse, (Canada: 2016) at 3.
18 Canada, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Paying the Price: The Economic Impacts
of Climate Change for Canada, (Ottawa, Ontario: 2011) at 118.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
14
15

Vol. 28

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

65

the higher these projected figures could run.
As the risks and unpredictability of these events increase there will be less
insurance coverage available for the resulting losses.21 The response of Canadian
insurers to recent catastrophic events indicates that these trends are already
starting to take shape. The 2016 Fort McMurray wildfires are estimated to cost at
least $3.58 billion, while the 2013 Alberta floods caused about $6 billion in
damage.22 The latter event was largely uninsured, as one could not purchase
insurance for overland flooding at that time, leaving the government to deal with
the majority of the costs.23 The Fort McMurray wildfires were mostly an insured
event and the response of insurers is a glimpse to the future. Insurers received as
many claims following the wildfires as they would normally see in a year. This led
to delays and communication issues with policy holders, which were further
compounded by consumer misconceptions regarding coverage.24 Commentary
from industry experts following the Fort McMurray wildfires also indicates that
it is likely insurers, in their response to catastrophic weather events, will increase
premiums and begin requiring the implementation of resiliency features to limit
potential future damages.25 The response of insurers in Alberta is not unique and
it represents some of the problems that damage from climate change will pose
for Canadians.
After the 2017 floods in Ottawa, numerous policy holders were denied
coverage because the “water travelled over land.”26 This specific restriction was a
response to the 2013 Alberta floods.27 Only fifteen insurance companies offer
Craig Brown & Sara Seck, “Insurance Law Principles: In an International Context: Compensating Losses
Caused by Climate Change” (2013) 50:3 Alta L Rev 541 at 542.
22 Wallis Snowdon, “Fort McMurray Wildfire Costliest Insured Disaster in Canadian History”, CBC News (07
July 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-costliest-insureddisaster-in-canadian-history-at-nearly-3-6b-1.3668602>.
23 Ibid.
24 David Thurton, “‘A lot of learning to do’: Wawanesa Insurance on Fort McMurray Wildfire Response”,
CBC News (15 November 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/a-lot-of-learning-todo-wawanesa-insurance-on-fort-mcmurray-wildfire-response-1.3851122>.
25 Sharon Crowther. “Insurance Claim ‘Chaos’ Slows Fort McMurray Rebuild”, The Globe and Mail (24 March
2017), online: <https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/real-estate/calgary-and-edmonton/insurance-claimchaos-slows-fort-mcmurray-rebuild/article33800364/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&>; Julie
Cazzin, “Higher Insurance Premiums a Fallout of the Fort McMurray Fire”, Maclean’s (4 May 2017), online
<http://www.macleans.ca/economy/higher-insurance-premiums-a-fallout-of-the-fort-mcmurray-fire/>.
26 James Bagnall, “The Great Flood of 2017: Aftermath Finds Many in Limbo”, Ottawa Citizen (2 July 2017),
online <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/the-great-flood-of-2017-aftermath-finds-many-inlimbo>.
27 Ibid.
21
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overland flood insurance, but if you live in a floodplain “the insurance is either
expensive or capped – often both.”28 The result is that many Ottawa
homeowners, just like homeowners in Alberta three years earlier, had to turn to
disaster assistance programs. In doing so, many homeowners found out that
provincial disaster relief has strict stipulations about how and where you are
allowed to rebuild.29
Both insurers and disaster relief funds are trying to mitigate future costs by
imposing requirements about how and where homes get rebuilt. These are but a
few Canadian examples, yet a pattern is emerging – after catastrophic disasters
insurers will respond by raising premiums, imposing requirements on future
coverage, capping pay outs, adding strict exclusions, or removing themselves
from that area of coverage altogether. It is also entirely possible that these
catastrophic weather events will become uninsurable in the future, as the
unpredictability and risk associated with climate harms increase. 30

INSURANCE LAW PRINCIPLES
The possibility for loss and damage from both the predicted and unforeseen
effects of climate change are almost infinitely variable, so insurers will continually
be exposed to unpredictable risks. As Craig Brown and Sara Seck have outlined,
there will be consequences for traditional property insurance as loss and damage
increase; for life, health, accident, and disease insurance as sickness and mortality
rise; for professional liability insurance as builders and professionals are held to
higher standards; for general commercial liability as corporations and businesses
will face a higher risk of litigation; for credit risk as projects and developments
are destroyed or delayed; and from new conceptions about what a “catastrophe”
means in an insurance contract.31 Most importantly, these unpredictable risks will
change the way insurers operate.
Insurance, at its core, is about transferring risk. To quote Denis Boivin, “risk
Ibid.
Ibid.
30 Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 542.
31 Ibid at 545.
28
29
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is a fortuitous event – an event that may or may not happen, the occurrence of
which does not depend on the will of the insured.”32 Typical “first-party”
insurance involves a policy holder (the first-party) who pays a premium (the fee
for coverage and the consideration for the contract) to the insurer, who, in return
for the fee, agrees to indemnify the policy holder should it incur a covered loss
set out in the insurance contract.33 A key principle of fortuity is that insurers do
not cover risks that are certain to occur. For example, wear and tear is not covered
in an insurance contract.34 Insurers also prefer uncorrelated risks (i.e. fire, theft,
or auto accidents) to correlated risks (i.e. floods, hurricanes, and forest fires).35 As
Brown and Seck note:
Insurers can provide protection against the financial
consequences of loss for a fraction of that loss because they
afford similar protection to multiple insureds knowing that loss
is going to happen to a relative few of them, and it is not known
in advance which of them will suffer loss. The key is the
randomness of loss in terms of when it happens, to whom it
happens, and its extent.36
The unpredictable nature of climate harms, their severity, and the increasing
certainty of their occurrence will create problems for insurers. Again to quote
Brown and Seck, “unpredictability of risk is what insurers fear most. When faced
with unpredictability, they assume the worst and price accordingly, or decline to
cover the hazard at all.”37 The problem is that climate risks are becoming more
certain, but the corresponding increase of risk, as well as the nature and extent of
that risk, remains unpredictable. It follows that insurers will respond to increased
and uncertain risk by either expanding restrictions, increasing premiums, or
simply withdrawing that type of coverage altogether.38 This is exactly how
Canadian insurers responded after the 2013 Alberta floods – few insurers even
Denis Boivin, Insurance Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 28.
Jeffrey W Stempel, “Insurance and Climate Change Litigation” in William CG Burns & Hari M Osofsky,
eds, “Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches” (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 230 at 230-31.
34 Boivin, supra note 32 at 28.
35 Stempel, supra note 33 at 230, n 2.
36 Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 546.
37 Ibid at 545.
38 Ibid at 547.
32
33
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offer overland flood insurance, those that do have expensive premiums and
limited, capped coverage. Insurance companies are able to do this because
insurance law is purely a contractual undertaking. Generally, where insurance
companies no longer want to offer coverage for that type of loss or damage, they
are mostly free to do so.
Insurance law looks to promote the financial interests of policy holders and
support their confidence in the industry, while also recognizing the need for
insurance companies to be profitable and financially stable.39 Insurance law is
inapplicable where there is no contract, because it simply does not apply.40 There
are situations, for example with automotive insurance, where legislation
intervenes to control the transfer of risk and actually mandates that the transfer
takes place, otherwise the risks faced by motorists would not be adequately
covered at reasonable premiums.41 But, Brown and Seck accurately outline why
legislative intervention that mandates coverage for catastrophic climate harm is
unlikely:
A legislature is unlikely to impose upon insurers obligations to
provide specific coverage at a specific premium without regard
to realistic actuarial considerations. If the predictions mentioned
previously hold true and certain types of catastrophic loss
become uninsurable according to the principles of private
insurance, mandatory provisions of coverage for inadequate
premiums would be a recipe for financial calamity. Even
mandated coverage must comply with basic insurance business
principles.42
Given the projected costs associated with climate change and based on
realistic actuarial considerations, it seems inevitable that the traditional first-party
insurance contract is going to have gaps in coverage, either due to unaffordable
premiums, restrictive exclusions, or from insurers simply withdrawing coverage.
Liability insurance provides an alternative avenue to compensate for losses
from climate change, and it will be more difficult for insurers to limit their
Ibid at 546.
Ibid.
41 Ibid at 556.
42 Ibid at 546.
39
40

Vol. 28

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

69

exposure to climate related risks in this context.43 Most major historical polluters
will have some form of a comprehensive or commercial general liability (“CGL”)
insurance or an “all-risk” commercial policy. These are best understood as a
bundle of various coverages lumped together.44 The same actuarial principles that
will increase premiums and limit coverage under first-party insurance will apply
to CGL insurance contracts too. For instance, asbestos exclusions are now
common in CGL insurance contracts as a result of asbestos litigation in the 1980s
and 1990s.45 Yet, there are two critical aspects common to most CGL insurance
contracts that will make it difficult for insurers to limit their risk exposure. First,
they typically include a “duty to defend,”46 and second, the latent nature of climate
change harm means that older CGL policies without specific pollution exclusions
may be triggered.47
The duty to defend is conceptually broader than an insurer’s duty to
indemnify, and this is especially important in relation to potential climate
litigation.48 In Progressive Homes Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co of Canada, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that “an insurer is required to defend a claim where the
facts alleged in the pleadings, if proven to be true, would require the insurer to
indemnify the insured of the claim.”49 The question is not whether the claim is
likely to succeed at trial. Rather, the question is whether the claim, if successful,
reveals a possibility for coverage under the policy. If so, the duty to defend is
triggered.50 This represents a significant risk to insurers. They could end up having
to spend significant sums just defending climate litigation regardless of whether
the claims are successful or not.
Insurers will undoubtedly still try to limit their exposure to the substantial
costs associated with climate litigation. It is axiomatic to insurance law that
intentional acts of the insured are not covered, and insurers are certainly going to
contend that climate harms fall outside the scope of CGL insurance contracts.51
Stempel, supra note 33 at 241.
Ibid at 235.
45 Ibid at 236, 248.
46 Boivin, supra note 32 at 410; Stempel, supra note 33 at 235.
47 Stempel, supra note 33 at 243-44.
48 Ibid at 236-37.
49 Progressive Homes Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co of Canada, 2010 SCC 33 at para 19, 2 SCR 245.
50 Boivin, supra note 32, at 410-411.
51 Stempel, supra note 33 at 241.
43
44
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Insurers will assert that polluters – especially major polluters in the energy,
transportation, and fossil fuel industries – knew what they were doing and that
their actions were volitional conduct that cannot be considered a “fortuitous”
event.52 Jeffrey Stempel suggests that it is generally a high bar to have claims
excluded as a result of intentional conduct by the insured and that it will probably
be difficult for insurers to prove polluters intended to bring about the deleterious
effects of climate change. 53 However, it strains credibility for any polluter to
seriously claim they were unaware of the dangers of climate change after 1990.54
Not to mention, there is mounting evidence that major polluters were engaged in
deceptive practices regarding the dangers of climate change.55
There is also jurisprudence suggesting that intent can be imputed to
polluters and that pollution is not necessarily “accidental” for the purpose of
liability insurance coverage.56 Imputed intent could permit the insurer to deny
payment for the claim. Nonetheless, given the fact that insurers bear the onus of
proof and given the traditional narrow interpretation of these exclusions, insurers
will certainly have an uphill battle avoiding their duty to defend. Many insurers
will likely be left defending actions and then trying to claim remuneration from
the insured after the fact.57 Express exclusion clauses will be similarly unhelpful,
since they are generally strictly construed and insurers again bear the burden of
demonstrating that the exclusion is clearly applicable. 58 Additionally, older CGL
policies, which are likely to be triggered by climate litigation, probably will not
have sufficiently explicit exclusion clauses to preclude a duty to defend.59
The existence of CGL policies means that insurers’ exposure to the
economic risks of climate change will not be limited to traditional first-party
Ibid.
Ibid.
54 Richard Heede, “Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and
Cement Producers, 1854-2010” (2014) 122:1-2 Climatic Change 229 at 230; Martin Olszynski, Sharon
Mascher, & Meinhard Doelle, “From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of
Climate Change Liability,” (2017) 30:1 Geo Envtl L Rev 1 at 15-16.
55 Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, “Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change Lies by New
York Attorney General” The New York Times (5 November 2015), online:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-overclimate-statements.html>
56 Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 547.
57 Stempel, supra note 33 at 245-47.
58 Ibid at 245.
59 Ibid at 243-244.
52
53
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insurance contracts. Under CGL policies, insurers could see claims from an
insured polluter in response to climate litigation against the insured party.
Accordingly, it seems likely that insurers will play some role in defending climate
change litigation on behalf of polluters. But it seems unlikely that insurers will
have to actually compensate any of these claims, since climate litigation to date
has mostly been stymied in the courts, as discussed below. Therefore, Canadians
who will increasingly be unable to rely on first-party insurance policies will be left
with inadequate means for compensation from climate harms. They will often be
forced to rely on provincial or federal disaster relief assistance, which probably
will not be able to fully compensate victims for loss and damage resulting from
climate change.

POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Litigating Climate Change: Nuisance and Negligence

The inadequate response of many governments in addressing and mitigating
climate change has spurred an increase in climate related litigation over the past
few years. However, the majority of these cases have not been aimed at
compensation. Instead, they have sought to compel governments to follow
international treaties and domestic legislation, as well as to force governments to
contemplate climate change when creating policy or enacting legislation. In the
landmark case of Urgenda Foundation v The State of Netherlands, the District Court
held that the Dutch Government had to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
by at least 25% by 2020 in comparison to 1990 levels.60 In Massachusetts v EPA,61
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the state of Massachusetts had
standing to bring the claim and that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
had to regulate GHG emissions in accordance with the Clean Air Act.62 While
these cases outline the potential viability of climate litigation going forward, there
have been far more unsuccessful than successful cases to date. For instance, in
Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 18; Urgenda Foundation v The State of Netherlands, C/09/456689 HA ZA 121396.
61 Massachusetts v EPA, 546 US 497 (2007). Justice Stevens wrote for the majority in a narrow 5-4 decision.
62 Clean Air Act, 42 USCA § 7401.
60

72

INSURANCE COVERAGE IN A CLIMATE CHANGED CANADA

Vol. 28

Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council),63 the Federal Court held that
under the language of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (“KPIA”),64 it had no
role in judicially reviewing the reasonableness of Canada’s efforts to meet its
Kyoto commitments. Some sections of the KPIA seemed to specifically require
Canada to honour its commitments to reduce emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol.65 Despite this, the Federal Court found there was a lack of binding
language in the KPIA and expressed hesitation about adjudicating on policy
decisions.66
While many of the aforementioned cases are important in the climate change
litigation context, the forms of relief sought will not help compensate victims of
climate related harms. The case of Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil
Corporation (Kivalina) takes a novel, but increasingly popularized,67 step in the
direction of holding major polluters responsible for their contribution to climate
related loss and damage.68 In 2008, the Village of Kivalina faced relocation costs
of $95 to $400 million after its coastline eroded because of melting sea ice, making
the area nearly uninhabitable.69 Kivalina’s claim was unsuccessful for a number
of reasons,70 but most importantly it failed because the District Court held that
Kivalina lacked standing, since there was “no realistic possibility of tracing any
particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any

Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 FC 1183 at para 46, 3 FCR 201 [Friends of the
Earth].
64 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30 [repealed by the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC
2012, c 19, s 699].
65 Ibid at ss 4-5, 7.
66 Friends of the Earth, supra note 63 at paras 33-37, 41.
67 See for example, Andrew Gage & Michael Byers, “Payback Time? What the Internalization of Climate
Litigation Could Mean for Canadian Oil and Gas Companies” (2014), online: West Coast Environmental Law
<https://www.wcel.org/publication/payback-time-what-internationalization-climate-litigation-could-meancanadian-oil-and>; David Grossman, “Tort-Based Climate Litigation” in William CG Burns & Hari M
Osofsky eds, Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009); Andrew Gage, “Climate Change Litigation and the Public Right to a Healthy
Atmosphere” (2013) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 257; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 19-20; Michael B Gerrard,
“What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like” (2011) 12:2 Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 12 at
12-13.
68 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, 663 F Supp (2d) 863 (2009) [Kivalina]. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F
(3d) 849 (2012). In Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corporation, 569 US 1000 (2013), the Supreme Court
of the United States denied Kivalina’s petition for writ of certiorari, upholding the decision from the Ninth
Circuit.
69 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 19.
70 Ibid at 19-20.
63
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specific person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time.”71 The Kivalina
decision confirmed the prevailing academic consensus that causation would be a
particularly challenging impediment to plaintiffs in climate change litigation. 72
Beyond issues with causation, the viability of civil suits in either nuisance or
negligence still remains very limited.
There are numerous obstacles to civil nuisance and negligence claims, to
discuss all of them in sufficient detail would be outside the scope of this paper.73
Instead, the focus will be on why climate litigation will likely be limited to
recovering against non-government entities and why state-led litigation is the best
option to compensate victims of climate harm. Firstly, it is clear that plaintiffs
looking to recoup losses from climate related harm will probably not find a viable
defendant in the government. It is well-established that when the government is
making “core policy” decisions, their actions will not ground liability in tort. 74 A
“core policy” decision is a decision or action that “[is] based on public policy
considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are
neither irrational nor taken in bad faith.”75 For example, the decision not to
honour the Kyoto Protocol commitments was undertaken with an eye to the
significant economic considerations associated with Canada’s dependence on
fossil fuels.76 Thus, absent specific evidence of bad faith, it seems highly unlikely
that any liability in tort will result from governmental decisions to prioritize
Canada’s economic considerations over its environmental commitments.
It is somewhat incongruous to suggest that government actors and
legislators will avoid liability before suggesting that polluters ought to be held
liable, and that governments ought to facilitate the imposition of this liability.
Kivalina, supra note 68; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 20.
Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 20; Gage, supra note 67 at 260-2; See also Jacqueline Peel, “Issues in
Climate Change Litigation” (2011) 5:1 Carbon & Climate L Rev 15; David Hunter & James Salzman,
“Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation” (2007) 155:6 U Pa L Rev 1741;
International Bar Association (“IBA”), “Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption”
Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, (July 2014), London; David Weisbach,
“Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change” (2012) 97 Iowa L Rev 521; Grossman, supra
note 67.
73 See Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 548-50 for a more complete outline of the various frailties at each level
of a negligence claim.
74 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42 at para 90, 2 SCR 45 [Imperial Tobacco]; Just v British Columbia,
[1989] 2 SCR 1228 at para 20, 64 DLR (4th) 689.
75 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 74 at para 90.
76 Friends of the Earth, supra note 63 at para 12.
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Major polluters have tended to view government regulation as the maximum
constraint on their conduct rather than as a bare minimum,77 and have for the
most part tended reduce emissions in strict accordance with government
regulations and legislation, rather than exceeding the minimum targets.78
Undeniably, Canadian governments must bear some of the blame for Canada’s
contributions to climate change and for their failure to facilitate creative solutions,
because while our understanding of the risks attendant to climate change continue
to evolve, the existence of climate related risks have still been apparent for a very
long time.79 However, even if governmental policy decisions were not barred
from liability, and no matter how much enacted environmental legislation left to
be desired,80 it does not make sense in the context of compensating climate harms
to draw these funds from the government.
In the face of shrinking insurance coverage, federal and provincial
governments will be bearing a substantial portion of the costs associated with
climate change through disaster relief programs.81 They will be forced to deal with
the effects of their inadequate response to climate change head-on, and defending
litigation would only exacerbate existing issues. Canadians would simply end up
bearing the burden for past government conduct. Major carbon polluters are
unlikely to voluntarily internalize the costs associated with their GHG
emissions.82 Thus, in accordance with the polluter pays principle, equity, and
concepts of corrective justice, major polluters should be forced to internalize at
least some of the costs associated with their actions. 83 In many regards the
government is in the best position to effectively and efficiently carry out tortbased litigation against major carbon polluters.84

Olszynski, supra note 54 at 8.
Ibid.
79 Heede, supra note 54 at 230; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 16; IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific
Assessment 1990, Summary for Policy Makers, Report of Working Group One (available at:
https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf).
80 Mike De Souza, “Oil Lobbyists Approved Harper’s Climate Policy as ‘Elegant’ Approach” Postmedia News
(29 April 2012).
81 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, supra note 15 at 2.
82 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 12.
83 David Grossman, “Warming Up to A Not So Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation” (2003)
28 Colum J Envt L 1 at 5; Boris N Mamlyuk, “Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and
Economics” (2009) 18:1 SE Envt LJ 40 at 42-4.
84 Grossman, supra note 67 at 217.
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With the government acting as plaintiff in a tort-based climate suit, some of
the causation issues that might frustrate tort claims are overcome. For instance,
governments are able to aggregate damages on a much larger scale than a single
litigant or even a community.85 As David Grossman notes, a single sinkhole in a
laneway as a result of thawing permafrost has a much more tenuous causal chain
than a provincial government tendering evidence of damaged roadways across an
entire province or state.86
The most viable and commonly discussed tort in the climate context is
nuisance.87 The basic principle of public nuisance is that there has been
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public (for
example, air quality is recognized as a general public right). 88 Public nuisance
claims have two important features that make them viable in the context of
climate litigation. First, they are typically brought by an Attorney General, so they
are a natural fit for the government as plaintiff.89 Second, the tort of public
nuisance simplifies the causal chain by focusing on unreasonable interference
with a public right, rather than a specific harm.90 The focus on the unreasonable
interference with a public right places greater emphasis on the harm suffered and
comparatively91 less emphasis on the defendant’s conduct or intentions.92 This
naturally results in the court balancing the utility of the defendants’ conduct or
interference against the harm caused.93 As the costs associated with climate
change continue to increase, the balancing part of this analysis should start to tip
toward the harm suffered by plaintiff.
Ibid.
Ibid.
87 Gage, supra note 67 at 262; Gerrard, supra note 67; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 28; Grossman supra
note 67 at 195-196.
88 Gage, supra note 67 at 262-7; Grossman supra note 67 at 195-7; British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products,
2004 SCC 38 at para 74, 2 SCR 74.
89 Gage, supra note 67 at 262.
90 Ibid. The connection between a defendants’ emissions and the harm suffered by a plaintiff is often
tenuous. It requires the plaintiff to prove a long chain of causation. While claims in both public and private
nuisance could potentially be viable, a claim in public nuisance is preferable to private nuisance because it
focuses on the effect of the defendants’ actions in regard to their interference with a public right. This
naturally simplifies the causal steps in comparison with a private nuisance claim, since it is more direct than
trying to prove that a single emitter was somehow responsible for rising temperatures, which in turn caused
a severe weather event that then damaged an individual plaintiff’s personal property.
91 The standard of care branch in a claim for negligence places comparatively more emphasis on the
defendant’s conduct when compared to the analysis undertaken in a tort of public nuisance.
92 Grossman, supra note 67 at 195-7.
93 Philip H Osborne, “The Law of Torts” 5th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 418.
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Many of the issues limiting a claim in nuisance are amplified by a claim in
negligence. Potential problems exist at almost every single stage of a negligence
claim.94 While a government plaintiff in a negligence claim might potentially
overcome some of the standing, justiciability, and causation issues, there remain
a number of enduring problems.95 Yet, it seems likely that many producers,
especially in the automotive industry, owed a duty to manufacture their products
reasonably and to warn consumers about the dangers associated with them.96 It
has been apparent at least since the early 1990s that humans were contributing to
global warming and that there were dangers associated with anthropogenic
climate change. 97 These dangers have only become better understood through
the end of that decade and into the present century.
In many cases, large-scale polluters from the energy, agricultural, and
transportation industries were acutely aware of the harm they could cause and in
some cases actively misled public opinion about the nature and extent of these
potential dangers.98 Thus, it can credibly be argued that the harms were and are
reasonably foreseeable.99 Defendants are generally only held liable to industry
standards at the time of their alleged negligence or nuisance, but if an entire
industry was engaged in conduct that was obviously fraught with risk, then
industry standards will not be of much assistance.100 Standard of care is an
objective determination that considers whether there was a reasonably
foreseeable risk, the likelihood of the harm or damage, the seriousness of the
threatened harm, the cost to prevent or reduce that harm, the utility of the
defendant’s conduct, and the applicable industry standards or customs.101
Determinations regarding standard of care often involve an economic costbenefit analysis, which considers the cost of preventative measures against the
Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 548; Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 19-22.
Grossman, supra note 67 at 206, 213, 215.
96 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 30.
97 Ibid; Heede, supra note 54 at 230. The IPCC warned about GHG emissions in relation to global warming
in 1990.
98 Gillis & Krauss, supra note 55; Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes,“Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate
Change Communications (1977-2014)” (2017) 12 Environmental Research Letters 1 at 15.
99 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 30. See also The TJ Hooper, 60 F2d 737 (2d Cir 1932). In this case, the
failure to equip tugs with radio equipment was negligent, despite the fact that it was industry standard not to
do so.
100 Osborne, supra note 92 at 38.
101 Ibid at 29-50.
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cost of the harm. If the cost of preventative measures exceeds the cost of the
harm occasioned, then it ought not to be taken.102 As the damage and costs
resulting from GHG emissions mount, it seems likely that this analysis will begin
to favour the prevention of these harms. As such, the use of the top industry
standards may prove to be a compelling defence for fossil fuel and automotive
companies.103 Alternatively, failing to adhere to best practices or engaging in
openly deceptive practices, may make certain companies an apt target for climate
litigation.104 As Martin Olszynski, Sharon Mascher, and Meinhard Doelle note,
the standard of care inquiry is specific to the tort of negligence, but the
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct will be an important consideration in
any climate-related tort.105
Ultimately, state-led climate litigation helps overcome some of the
jurisdictional, standing, and causation issues common to most civil litigants.106 In
many respects a public nuisance claim brought by an Attorney General seems to
be the most viable tort for effective state-led litigation.107 Yet, public nuisance
claims will not adequately compensate the type of widespread, specific harm to
property and person that will result from climate change. In this regard,
negligence is the optimal tort for recovering against major carbon polluters for
specific harms to property and infrastructure. But negligence in the climate
change context is currently plagued by a number of issues at every level of the
analysis and these stages of “prospecting” and “defining” may take the common
law years to flesh out.108 Gage and Byers note that novel fields of civil claims are
typified by an initial period of trial and error where the likelihood of success is
initially underestimated before eventual success and “mega-recovery.”109

Ibid at 40.
CBC News, “Going Electric” (3 October 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/goingelectric-1.4192167>.
104 Guilbert Gates et al, “How Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices” Worked” The New York Times (16 March
2017), available online at: < https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-dieselemissions-scandal-explained.html>; Hunter & Salzman, supra note 72 at 1773-1774; Grossman, supra note 67
at 204-05.
105 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 32.
106 Gage, supra note 67 at 262; see also 262, n 13.
107 Ibid.
108 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 22.
109 Ibid.
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There may well be successful civil actions in negligence and nuisance in the
future,110 and as Jeffrey Stempel has hypothesized, the interplay of experienced
insurance litigators defending these claims may help order the process.111 But
Stempel’s view seems a bit idealistic. It seems more likely that insurers and carbon
polluters will simply frustrate the process of climate litigation in a manner similar
to how tobacco companies successfully defended litigation for decades.112 As
Olszynski, Mascher, and Doelle note, private litigation of tobacco companies had
been largely unsuccessful until tobacco legislation “fundamentally changed the
rules of the tobacco liability game.”113
The blueprint for successful climate litigation exists, the Canadian government
just needs to put it to use. Canada cannot wait for climate litigation to advance
out of its infancy stage. Loss and damage from anthropogenic climate change
already costs Canada billions every year. As a matter of efficiency, it makes sense
for state-led climate litigation to take the lead against major carbon polluters.
Richard Heede’s research has outlined the major historical GHG polluters.114
These major polluters represent the first step for state-led climate litigation.115
Indeed, the Canadian government litigating against major carbon polluters and
then allocating those funds to disaster relief or no-fault climate insurance
programs would be more practical than proceeding through the trials and
tribulations of civil litigation. Being proactive is going to be imperative. State-led
climate litigation that is enabled by legislation will be more effective and efficient
in holding polluters accountable than relying on common law developments.
Ideally, as a society we want compensation from those responsible for causing

Ibid at 16-18.
Stempel, supra note 33 at 250-51.
112 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 13; BA Levin, “The Liability of Tobacco Companies – Should Their Ashes
Be Kicked” (1987) 29 Ariz L Rev 195 at 200.
113 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 12-13.
114 Heede, supra note 54 at 231-34. Heede’s research has found that about 63% of global industrial emissions
between 1751-2010 can be attributed to 90 companies. They are commonly referred to as the “carbon
majors.” It is also important in the climate litigation context, since more than half of the emissions have
been emitted since 1986.
115 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 15. Gage & Byers noted that there are five oil and gas companies from
Heede’s report that are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. If the tobacco legislation was adopted and
implemented in the climate context, these five companies would represent the natural starting point for
state-led climate litigation.
110
111

Vol. 28

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

79

harm or damage, and in the climate context this will require litigating against the
major carbon polluters.
The Government as Plaintiff: Tobacco Legislation Method

Martin Olszynski, Sharon Mascher, and Meinhard Doelle have thoroughly
explored the use of tobacco legislation in the climate litigation context.116 The
IBA,117 as well as Andrew Gage and Margaretha Wewerinke,118 have both
published separate “Model Climate Acts.” It is again outside the scope of this
paper to consider all three in full, but they offer additional ideas on potential
climate legislation and also provide important perspective on the potential for
international climate litigation. The model legislation from Olszynski, Mascher,
and Doelle is preferable for the scope of this paper because it focuses specifically
on domestic litigation and it incorporates a realistic application of previous
Canadian tobacco legislation in a uniquely Canadian context. The application of
this type of legislation in the climate context seems both applicable and
desirable.119
In British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd,120 the Supreme Court of
Canada, despite vigorous opposition from tobacco companies, upheld the
constitutionality of the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act
(“TDHCCRA”).121 This legislation allowed the British Columbia government to
directly recover against tobacco companies for healthcare costs associated with
tobacco related disease.122 Olszynski, Mascher, and Doelle listed four concepts

See Olszynski et al, supra note 54. The authors come to the conclusion that this type of legislation, while
not without its constraints and issues, is both likely and feasible. Their conclusions are mostly supported by
this paper, and given the breadth and detail of their analysis, this section of the paper adopts many of their
findings and suggestions. For a more detailed account of the history of tobacco legislation and its parallels to
climate litigation refer to their article.
117 IBA, supra note 72 at 127-36.
118 Andrew Gage & Margaretha Wewerinke, “Taking Climate Justice into Our Own Hands: A Model Climate
Compensation Act” (2015), online: West Coast Environmental Law <
https://www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/cca_report_updated_web.pdf>.
119 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 9; Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 35-36.
120 British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2005 SCC 49 at para 7, 2 SCR 473. [BC v Imperial]
121 Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, SBC 2000, c 30 [TDHCCRA]; Olszynski et al, supra note
54 at 7; Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 35.
122 JTI-Macdonald Corp v AGBC, 2000 BCSC 312 at para 12, 184 DLR (4th) 335; Olszynski et al, supra note 54
at 7; Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 35.
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from the tobacco legislated which could be “highly relevant” to the climate
change liability context:
(1) It creates a direct action against tobacco companies by the provinces
to recover the public costs of healthcare incurred as a result of
tobacco-related disease where such disease is the result of some
“tobacco-related wrong”, defined broadly as the breach of “a
common law, equitable or statutory duty or obligation owed to
persons” in that province;
(2) It permits the provinces to use statistical, epidemiological, and
sociological evidence to establish causation on an aggregate basis and to
quantify damages (i.e. the province’s cost of healthcare services for
tobacco-related disease
(3) It apportions liability based on the market share of particular tobacco
companies; and
(4) It applies retroactively.123
In British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, Justice Major held:
… s.2(1) [of the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery
Act] creates a cause of action by which the government of British
Columbia may recover from a tobacco manufacturer money
spent treating disease in British Columbians, where such disease
was caused by exposure to a tobacco product (whether entirely
in British Columbia or not), and such exposure was caused by
that manufacturer’s tort in British Columbia, or breach of a duty
owed to persons in British Columbia.124
The Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the TDHCCRA created a
distinct and direct cause of action that solved many of the issues that were
hampering tort litigation against tobacco companies.125 Specifically, it solved
many of the issues relating to causation and the apportionment of damages, which

Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 12-13 [emphasis added].
Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 26; BC v Imperial, supra note 120 at paras 2-7.
125 BC v Imperial, supra note 120 at para 7.
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are two of the biggest hurdles in the climate context.126 The TDHCCRA restricted
liability (i.e. potential defendants) to “manufacturers”127 but defined the term
broadly.128 The tobacco legislation indicates that legislation in the climate context
would not need to target all potential defendants to maintain its legality, rather it
could target specific industries or classes of corporations within industries to
attract liability.129
Potential climate legislation would rely on state-led litigation, either at the
provincial or federal level – or both.130 It would also be amenable to nuisance,
negligence, or other various torts.131 Improving the viability of a claim in
negligence would be critical, as it would allow provincial and federal governments
to recover for expenses related to direct harm incurred by its constituents or for
damage to state infrastructure. Climate legislation could address issues about
limitation periods, recognize or create new legal rights, provide reciprocal
enforcement, and define remedies.132 Most importantly though, this legislation
would directly address issues of causation and apportionment. Under the ‘but for’
causation standard, it would be difficult if not impossible to prove that the
associated climate harms would not have occurred absent a specific polluters’
emissions.133 Instead, climate legislation could use a variated form of the material
contribution of risk test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Clements v.
Clements.134 Regardless of the exact approach taken, the legislation will need to
Peel, supra note 72 at 16. Peel refers to the drop in the “drop in the ocean” problem, which outlines that it
is difficult to say any one entity is responsible for climate change given the immense number of polluters
spread out around the globe. It makes determining contribution difficult. Peel also notes the issue of “proof”
(i.e. that it is almost impossible to prove that GHG emissions from a particular entity or facility gave rise to a
specific impact or harm).
127 TDHCCRA, supra note 121 at s 1.
128 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 34.
129 Ibid at 35.
130 Ibid at 26.
131 Ibid at 28-31.
132 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 36.
133 Osborne, supra note 92 at 54. The ‘but for’ test determines causation based on a simple question, “would
the plaintiffs damage have occurred but for the defendant’s negligence?”
134 Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32 at paras 40, 46, 2 SCR 181; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 42. The
“material contribution to risk” test is utilized where the ‘but for’ test has essentially been satisfied, but has
broken down when applied to each defendant individually. Olszynski et al have noted that the legislation
could, as it did in the tobacco context, create a rebuttable presumption that the costs incurred by the
province were the result of emissions-generating activities. The defendants would be subject to liability that
they did not cause alone, subject to a reverse burden of proof where it would fall on them to satisfy the court
on the balance of probabilities that their breaches did not cause or contribute to costs incurred by the
province. They also note that test does not work seamlessly and some variation to the traditional de minimus
126
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adapt the common law principles surrounding causation to ensure a fair but
effective test for causation.
Apportionment is a specifically troublesome aspect of climate litigation and
it will take creative solutions from the legislature to devise a formulation that is
both fair and logically sound. Olszynski, Mascher, and Doelle have suggested that
the legislation could divide “the cost incurred by a government in a given year by
the total GHG emissions in that same year, and use the resulting cost per ton as
the basis for apportioning liability.”135 This is imperfect because the majority of
the costs incurred will be in the future and, hopefully, the bulk of the emissions
will have been emitted in the past. It seems necessary then to ensure that the
formula for apportioning damages takes into account historical emissions, while
also incorporating considerations of present day contributions and reductions.
Determining the parameters of any potential formula for apportioning
damages will be complex. Ideally, legislation will enable the government to
recover against corporations for past pollution that pre-dates the legislation, while
simultaneously allowing them to spur better industry practices by recovering for
continued excess emissions after the legislation is enacted. A formula of this
nature would also raise some difficult questions – how far back should liability go
and on what basis? Unfortunately, there is no neat and tidy conceptual framework
to deal with climate litigation and any date selected could be criticized as being
somewhat arbitrary, but a date set within 1986-1990 seems the most logical.
Heede’s research noted that half of the industrial CO2 and CH4 emitted between
1751 and 2010 has been emitted since 1984.136 In 1990, the IPCC released its First
Assessment Report that linked, with certainty, emissions resulting from human
activities to substantial increases in atmospheric concentrations of GHG and a
corresponding increasing in additional warming to Earth’s surface.137
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to begin imposing liability on polluters at a time
where their emissions increased despite credible warnings about the adverse
rule would be necessary, since even the carbon majors from Heede’s analysis would be excluded by the
operation of this rule.
135 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 44.
136 Heede, supra note 54 at 234. “Of the emissions traced to carbon major fossil fuel and cement production,
half has been emitted since 1986.”
137 Ibid, at 230; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 16.
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impact they would have on earth’s climate. The formula could then apportion
liability based on the percentage of the specific companies’ contribution to
emissions during the period. As methods for modelling climate change improve,
it will become easier to apportion fault and determine causation for climate
related harms.
A corollary and critically important benefit to immediately adopting climate
legislation would be to spur better industry wide standards in regards to limiting
GHG emissions. The more GHG that continues to enter the atmosphere, the
more difficult it will be to meet the temperature goals set out in the Paris
Agreement.138 Climate legislation would put the proverbial writing on the wall for
GHG emitters that they either need to shape up or keep paying out. The fossil
fuel, automotive, and energy sectors have left a lot to be desired with respect to
their disclosure of the associated risks of climate change and, in at least a few
instances, they have gone as far as to actively engage in misinformation.139 As
previously mentioned, the reasonableness of companies’ actions will be directly
relevant to most torts, so engaging in best practices or perhaps even exceeding
industry standards will limit future liability for major carbon polluters. 140 To
summarize, enacting climate legislation modeled after the tobacco legislation will
accomplish two critical things: firstly, it will allow the federal or provincial
government(s) to recoup losses associated with climate change; and secondly, it
will push major carbon polluters to decrease their emissions in the interest of
reducing their future liability.
Filling the Gaps: Disaster Relief and No-Fault Insurance

Irrespective of how governments can raise additional funds from climate
litigation, there must be efficient, cost-effective programs in place to help fill the
impending gaps in first-party insurance coverage. One way to provide
compensation would be through a more comprehensive and robust disaster relief
IPCC, supra note 1 at 3-9; Paris Agreement, supra note 6 at preamble, art 2(a).
Gates, supra note 104; Gillis & Krauss, supra note 55; Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 24; Kathy Mulvey &
Seth Shulman, “The Climate Deception Dossiers: Internal Fossil Fuel Industry Memos Reveal Decades of Corporate
Disinformation” (July 2015) Union of Concerned Scientists, online:
<https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf>.
140 Olszynski et al, supra note 54 at 45; Grossman, supra 67 at 204-5.
138
139

84

INSURANCE COVERAGE IN A CLIMATE CHANGED CANADA

Vol. 28

program. The federal government has recently rolled back what they are willing
to spend on disaster relief.141 Instead, the federal government has prioritized
funding disaster mitigation and have allocated $2-billion for disaster mitigation
funding in the most recent federal budget.142 This shift in funding comes after the
Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (“DFAA”) program paid out more
during the fiscal years from 2009-10 to 2014-15 than during the preceding 39
years combined.143 While it is important to have the necessary funding available
to augment provincial disaster relief, it is probably sound policy to begin funding
adaptation efforts as well. Studies show that adaptation and mitigation spending
will save more money in the long run and lead to more efficient results.144 These
additional funds could be used to improve flood plain mapping, help build above
code, or improve deficient infrastructure.145 The question remains whether
provinces will maximize this adaptation and mitigation funding, since prior
mitigation funding under the DFAA program was often not utilized as effectively
by the provinces as it could have been.146
If the federal government continues to cut disaster relief funding in favour
of funding mitigation efforts, then the bulk of the costs associated with loss and
damage will be borne by the provinces. At present, provinces have to apply to
the federal government to have a portion of their costs reimbursed through the
DFAA program.147 Currently, pursuant to the cost sharing formula of the DFAA,
a province must spend more than $3.19 per capita before it can apply for any
federal funding.148 In 2015, the federal government increased the per capita
provincial spending required to receive 90% reimbursement from $5 per capita
Maura Forrest, “Federal Government Cutting Back on Disaster Assistance as Floods Become More Severe”, The
National Post (10 May 2017), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/federal-government-cutting-back-ondisaster-assistance-as-floods-become-more-severe>.
142 Don Forgeron, “Ottawa Gets It Right on Funding for Disaster Mitigation” The Globe and Mail (30 April
2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/ottawa-gets-itright-on-funding-for-disastermitigation/article34860059/>. Don Forgeron is the CEO of the Insurance
Bureau of Canada and was writing an opinion piece for The Globe and Mail.
143 Spring 2016 Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, supra note
15 at 2.
144 Ibid at 3; National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, supra note 18 at 119-20.
145 Spring 2016 Reports of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, supra note
15 at 3.
146 Ibid at 12.
147 Public Safety Canada, Guidelines for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements, (Canada: 2019) online:
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/gdlns-dsstr-ssstnc/index-en.aspx>
[Guidelines for the DFAA].
148 Ibid.
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to $15.97 per capita.149 Thus, provinces are expected to bear a significant portion
of the costs before federal funding becomes available, so what provinces choose
to cover or not to cover becomes very important.
Many of the provinces have similar acts in place for disaster assistance. In
British Columbia, the Compensation and Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation
(“CDFAR”) sets out the particulars of the provinces’ approach to disaster
response.150 Following adisaster, the government will set the criteria for assistance
and appoint adjusters who make suggestions about the amount of assistance, and
applicants can appeal these decisions if they are not satisfied.151 Disaster
assistance is limited to a principal residence, farm materials, community service
materials, or small businesses.152 Applicants can also have their claim reduced or
denied if it is determined that they did not take sufficient action to protect their
property “before, during, or after the occurrence of the disaster.” 153 Claims will
also be denied if insurance was “reasonably and readily available” for the damage
suffered.154 The CDFAR also requires structures erected in a flood plain to be
properly protected in order to be eligible for funding.155 The end result is that
there are a number of exclusions and requirements for individuals to receive
funding. It is also clear that both the provincial and federal governments are trying
to reduce their involvement in flood assistance, which is not surprising given the
high costs generally associated with flooding.156
The CDFAR sets a limit on relief to 80% percent of the amount over $1,000,
up to a maximum award of $300,000.157 In Alberta, like British Columbia, the
Minister can determine appropriate damages and these findings can also be
appealed.158 There are also similar limits on acceptable claims.159 Ontario also has
similar cost limitations on items claimed, on requests for appeal, on eligibility
Ibid. See Table 1 – Cost-sharing formula up to January 31, 2015.
Compensation and Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation, BC Reg 211/2105 (“CDFAR”).
151 Ibid at s 19; Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996 c 111, at ss 1(1), 19(1),; Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 558.
152 CDFAR, supra note 150 at ss 8(1), 9.
153 Ibid at s 16.
154 Ibid at s 8(1), “eligible costs” (a).
155 Ibid at s 15.
156 Jason Thistlethwaite & Daniel Henstra, “Municipal Flood Risk Sharing in Canada: A Policy Instrument Analysis”
(2017) 42:4 Canadian Water Resources J 349 at 349-353; Bagnall, supra note 26.
157 CDFA, supra note 150 at s 13.
158 Disaster Recovery Regulation, Alta Reg 51/1994, at ss 2, 7-8.
159 Ibid at ss 3, 9.
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requirements for reimbursement, and pays 90% of a claim after $500 dollars up
to a limit of $250,000.160 Thus, in many provinces, disaster assistance is essentially
acting as an insurance plan that only covers damage to what the province deems
to be essential items or property, and generally restoration is limited to restoring
basic conditions.
The emphasis on taking reasonable steps to protect personal property and
limit damage is important because this will help governments reduce their costs.
However, exclusions and stringent protection requirements regarding flood
zones are common to many provincial relief funds. As a result, these policies are
likely to create classes of claimants who are unfairly subjected to loss and damage
from climate change without opportunity for relief. It will be important to
combine federal funding, which is increasingly focused on adaptation and
mitigation, with effective provincial funding for post-disaster relief to help
support claimants who are adversely affected by climate change. As evidenced by
the response to the 2017 Ottawa floods, it seems likely that after major flooding
events we will not be able to build where we have or how we have previously.161
As such, adaptation and mitigation will need to be absorbed into our response to
disaster relief in an effort to limit future expenses.
It could also be feasible for provinces to put funds acquired from climate
litigation toward a form of no-fault climate insurance. The guideline would be
something similar to a worker’s compensation model. Traditional worker’s
compensation has meant that workers give up their right to sue for negligent
injury (workable in the climate context because the government would be
litigating instead) and in return, they are guaranteed compensation for injuries
suffered at work irrespective of fault.162 Workers’ compensation funds would
receive contributions from employers relative to their accident history and the
payments would then be administered by the government.163 In the climate
Ontario Municipal Affairs, Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians Program Guidelines, online:
<http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/AssetFactory.aspx?did=13630>. See s 2.3 for cost limits, s 2.7 for
reconsideration, and ss 3-6 for eligibility of homeowners, small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and
farms.
161 Bagnall, supra note 26; Warren & Lemmen, supra note 9 at 149-53.
162 Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 555; Samuel A Rea, Jr, “Economic Analysis of Fault and No-Fault
Liability Systems” (1987) 12 CBLJ 444 at 452.
163 Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 555; Rea, supra note 162 at 452.
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context, the program could be partially funded through the litigation of carbon
polluters (or through other means of acquiring funds established through the
legislation) and the provinces would then distribute funding to claimants who
have suffered climate related harms.
A revamped and enhanced disaster relief program remains preferable to the
worker’s compensation model for a few reasons. Firstly, there are existing disaster
relief funds that can be adapted upon and improved, whereas a no-fault climate
insurance program would be a novel undertaking. Secondly, under existing
disaster funding there is an impetus placed on applicants to exercise due care and
take reasonable precautions to limit their damages. Admittedly, similar
requirements could be attached to a no-fault program but this would contravene
the general premise behind a “no-fault” program, since they generally compensate
irrespective of the reasonableness of the claimants conduct. 164 Lastly, there are
existing mechanisms in federal and provincial disaster relief funds to more
efficiently integrate adaptation and mitigation into the programs, which will help
limit future costs. Regardless of the program utilized, the essential component of
any program will be to allow provincial constituents to augment their decreasing
insurance coverage.
As insurance premiums and deductibles increase, a more robust and
comprehensive disaster relief program could allow claimants to utilize their
government funding to make their insurance coverage more affordable.165
Functionally, if a claimant received a $150,000 award, this could then be utilized
as a deductible for a larger insurance claim.166 If climate litigation can infuse
funding to disaster relief programs, then the interplay between disaster relief
funding and private insurance provides the potential for a number of creative
solutions to maintain comprehensive coverage despite increasingly unpredictable
risk.
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INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The bulk of this analysis has been focused on Canada’s climate risks and
potential domestic solutions, but climate change has no borders and there are a
number of transboundary considerations that warrant a brief discussion. Firstly,
the use of reinsurance could be a viable way for Canadian insurers to mitigate
risk. Reinsurance is essentially insurance for insurance companies.167 Large
international insurers such as Munich Re, who wrote €22.2 billion of reinsurance
in 2010, issue insurance to smaller insurance companies on the risks that they are
exposed to.168 Thus, severe losses in one country or region (i.e. the 2016 Fort
McMurray or 2013 Alberta floods) are balanced out by a loss free year in another
country or region.169 The problem is that reports from Munich Re in 2012 seem
to suggest that both the number and the severity of major weather related
catastrophes are increasing globally. 170 The global scope of climate change poses
an issue for reinsurance companies, because as extreme weather events increase
across the globe it will be harder for them to balance their risk exposure. If
reinsurance companies are going to remain an effective risk reduction
mechanism, then they must develop more advanced and accurate modelling of
catastrophic weather events, as well as a better understanding of the natural
environment and how it is changing.171

Stuart N Lane, “Explaining Changing Catastrophe Losses” (2012) 97:2 Geography 100 at 100.
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Figure B: Outlines the global increase in catastrophic events from 1980-2012.
Source: Munich Re 2012
Secondly, in order to meet the emission and temperature targets set out in
the Paris Agreement, at some point fossil fuel companies are going to have to
stop extracting their reserves. The problem is that the valuation of fossil fuel
companies takes into account their current and potential reserves.172 Where
reserves contribute to the market capitalization rate of a company, but cannot be
used, then they become ‘stranded assets.’173 Presently, Canada’s fossil fuel
reserves are larger than the amount of carbon that we can burn off in accordance
with reasonable projections to stay within the 2°C target from Paris.174 Marc Lee
and Brock Ellis looked at 114 fossil fuel companies operating in Canada and
developed an estimate of their potential carbon liabilities.175 Their estimates
suggest that Canada’s major fossil fuel companies have carbon liabilities ranging
from $844 billion on the low end to $5.7 trillion on the high end. 176 Twelve of
the larger companies combined have carbon liabilities between $500 billion and
$3.5 trillion.177 Many of Canada’s largest carbon polluters are also its most

Marc Lee & Brock Ellis, Canada’s Carbon Liabilities: The Implications of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets for
Financial Markets and Pensions Funds (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: 2013) at 13-14.
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vulnerable to carbon liability, and this will create problems for future climate
litigation.
Canada is uniquely vulnerable to carbon liability. About 80% of the world’s
oil reserves are nationalized, and Canada has two thirds of the remaining nonnationalized reserves.178 This has made it a hot spot for foreign investment, but
this makes Canada’s economy especially vulnerable to the impending fall out of
the fossil fuel industry. This also poses a major issue for state-led litigation of
major fossil fuel companies. Any legislation that enables government litigation
against major fossil fuel companies will also systemically begin to devalue them,
and as it becomes more certain that their reserves will stay in the ground these
‘assets’ will properly be regarded as massive liabilities. With increasing scrutiny of
emissions standards, internalization of their pollutions’ true environmental costs,
and their mounting carbon liabilities, major fossil fuel companies in Canada are
susceptible to losing some, if not all, of their current market valuations.
It should be noted that the goal of litigating against major carbon polluters
is not to bankrupt them, indeed the failure of many of the major carbon polluters
in Canada would be extremely problematic for the Canadian economy. However,
major fossil fuel companies have mostly treated pollution as an externality that is
borne by the population at large, which cannot be permitted to continue. The
goal of litigation against carbon polluters is to help fund mitigation and relief
efforts by forcing them to internalize at least some of the costs from their
pollution, but hopefully it will also spur better industry wide practices and prompt
investment into advancing renewable energy practices. Many of these companies
are already exploring and investing in renewable energy.179 Climate litigation can
help accelerate this process by positively rewarding companies who adopt best
practices relative to current industry standards.
Thirdly, it is also unlikely that Canada will receive any international financial
assistance to help offset the increasing costs of climate change. To date, the
Ibid at 7-8.
Tony Seskus, “As Renewable Energy Grows, So Does Interest From Big Oil”, CBC News (May 10, 2018),
online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/renewable-energy-oil-1.4656106>; Anna Hirtenstein,
“ExxonMobil Is Spending $1 Billion A Year In Researching Renewable Energy”, Independent (November 3,
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UNFCCC has not explicitly set out a scheme for international compensation for
climate related loss and damage. The Warsaw Mechanism was created to provide
an instrument for international review for loss and damage associated with
climate change.180 It was important because it set out a separate head of loss and
damage for the UNFCCC, but it does not use any binding language regarding
compensation or liability for loss and damage. 181 It is a review and assessment
tool for the UNFCCC to “facilitate international co-operation related to climate
loss and damage.”182
The inclusion of loss and damage was a hotly debated topic during the Paris
Agreement in 2015. Many developed countries, Canada included, were reluctant
to have a head of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement. 183 Given the
tremendous climate risks most developed countries face, it is obviously highly
unpopular to have a binding head of loss and damage that requires them to
compensate smaller, undeveloped countries for climate-related harms. Article 8
of the Paris Agreement formally recognized loss and damage as separate from
adaptation and mitigation.184 Although, there was no express recognition of
binding legal responsibility or financial obligations associated with this formal
recognition of loss and damage. Under Article 8(3) the Paris Agreement expressly
recognized “action and support” in a “cooperative and facilitative basis with
respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate
change.”185 However, it is unclear who that applies to and what it entails. The
UNFCC has subsequently noted that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement does not
“involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.” 186 Given that
international treaties and agreements to date have been punctuated with vague,
non-committal pronouncements about loss and damage, it seems unlikely that
Canada will either receive any international compensation or be forced to pay any
compensation. Even if a binding head of loss and damage is established by the
UNFCCC, Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, FCCC/SB/2017, UNFCCC, 47th Sess (2017) at 3.
181 Ibid at 5-10.
182 Gage & Byers, supra note 67 at 32.
183 Ibid.
184 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at art 8. Adaptation and mitigation are covered separately under art 9.
185 Ibid at art 8(3).
186 Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 21st Sess
(2016) at para 51.
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UNFCCC, which seems politically impossible at the moment, Canada, an affluent
country with a history of high emissions, will probably be compensating other
countries’ climate related harms rather than receiving compensation itself.187

CONCLUSION
It is increasingly clear that global warming poses an unprecedented threat to
humanity. If immediate action is not taken on a global scale to reduce emissions,
then we will lose any semblance of control over the path that global warming
takes.188 The Paris Agreement is undeniably a positive step in the right direction,
but it already seems unlikely that we will meet our temperature targets coming
out of COP-21, and that is assuming countries actually adhere to the agreement.189
Beyond the obvious implications for humanity on a global scale, climate change
will pose a number of unique domestic challenges. Canada is already experiencing
an unprecedented amount of insurance and disaster relief claims arising from
catastrophic weather events. Canada has spent more on disaster relief and
insurance claims in the past few years than at any time in our history. 190 The
private insurance industry, in its current iteration, will not be able to adequately
compensate for the expected loss and damage resulting from climate change
without government intervention.191
Unquestionably, some changes need to be made. Based on recent
catastrophic events in Alberta and Ottawa it is clear that better education of
consumers, clearer policies, better communication between insurers and insured,
as well as a realistic understanding on the part of the insured about what insurance
does and does not do will be imperative in a climate changed Canada.192
Additionally, Canadian governments must move quickly to adopt legislation that
allows them to effectively and efficiently litigate against major carbon polluters
before the valuation of these companies begins to decrease. It is clear that Canada
Brown & Seck, supra note 21 at 574-575.
IPCC, supra note 1 at 9.
189 Bergkamp, supra note 7 at 36.
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is precariously reliant on the fossil fuel industry.193 Fossil fuel companies have
benefitted from this reliance by treating their GHG emissions as an externality
borne by the population at large. As a matter of corrective justice and in line with
the polluter pays principle this should not continue. Adopting legislation modeled
after the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act would be an efficient
and effective way to enable litigation against major carbon polluters in Canada.194
Specifically, this legislation would address issues of causation and apportionment
of damages that seem to be the greatest obstacle to successful litigation. Canada
cannot wait for civil litigation in the climate context to advance out of its infancy
stage.
The manner in which Canadian governments raise the requisite funds to
supplement traditional insurance is open to debate. Whether it is a carbon tax,
legislation enabling climate litigation, or some form of legislation mandating
contribution from major polluters, the key is that the government takes action to
begin raising the necessary funds. Climate legislation aiding state-led litigation
presents one viable avenue. As Brown and Seck note, a carbon tax administered
through disaster relief funds could also be a viable solution to supplement
traditional insurance schemes.195 Traditionally, carbon taxes have been used to
fund adaptation or mitigation. But, a carbon tax could be adapted to fund loss
and damage from catastrophic weather events as well. To date, carbon taxes have
not been well received publicly and the concept of litigating against fossil fuel,
automotive, and energy companies is probably similarly unpopular.196 However,
as insurance coverage starts to become more expensive or cease to exist
altogether, and as the costs associated with climate change mount, public
perception may shift. Regardless, some form of government intervention is
inevitable, whether it is via legislation enabling state-led litigation, a carbon tax,
or a combination of both.
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How effectively the government is able to distribute these additional funds
will define our experience in a climate changed Canada. Many countries are
already taking proactive approaches to limit their susceptibility to climate
change.197 The Canadian government has allocated $2 billion dollars to fund
adaption and mitigation in the most recent federal budget. At present, this has
come at the expense of less comprehensive disaster relief funding, but in the longterm both these programs must be supported with additional funding. It will be
imperative that adaption and mitigation function in concert with loss and damage
to minimize costs before, during, and after catastrophic weather events. It also
seems inevitable that in response to disasters we often will not be able to rebuild
where or how we did before, so our response to climate change will need to be
flexible and adaptive in its approach.
There are viable combinations of legislation, litigation, taxation,
compensation, mitigation, adaptation, and insurance to proactively address some
of the deleterious effects of climate change in Canada. However, Canada will need
to develop domestic solutions to climate change because they are unlikely to
receive any international support, and even if it seems politically impossible at
present, there remains the possibility that Canada may even end up compensating
other countries for their loss and damage. Canada has been a laggard with regard
to reducing GHG emissions, so we should start by addressing our own domestic
issues before looking outward to the broader international context. Ultimately,
our government’s ability to extract compensation from companies that form the
cornerstone of our precariously situated fossil-fuel-dependent-economy, while
simultaneously addressing reduced insurance coverage and increased disaster
relief costs, will determine much of our experience in a climate changed Canada.
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